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especially in the interest of the public health, do the best that it can to conceal the gulf that yawns between the two parts of human nature, the decent part and the part that must be veiled; but it may conclude that this gulf is as real, if it is not so deep, as most men tacitly assume it to be.

That belief was not Whitman's. So long as there are in the world people who, whatever common sense and the instinct of conformity may lead them to do, find a satisfaction, and a deeper common sense, in thinking of the human nature that they share as through and through a wholesome thing, so long Whitman's courageous utterance of his doctrine will find admiring listeners. Possibly "Leaves of Grass" will be a force perpetually operative to prevent at least fairly educated men and women from ever yielding wholly to that odd instinct which prompts human nature to defame itself to its own imagination by insisting that certain parts of itself are inescapably shameful and abhorrent; an instinct which has found its most conspicuous expression, among English-speaking people, at least, in the ever memorable and unloved writings of Jonathan Swift.

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THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY.

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THE problem of personality is frequently approached from the point of view of introspection, by which means, it is supposed, the individual will most readily fathom the intimacies of self-hood. Then, by inference, he may hope to learn something about other personalities, using his own introspective experience as a guide. It seems clear that introspection has distinct advantages and that there are some ways in which we are better

equipped to study our own personality than the personality of any other. This advantage is found in the more detailed information which we have with respect to our own minds and conduct, giving us both a broader grasp as well as a more intimate knowledge of the things which make or characterize personality. We are, for example, because of this more intimate knowledge of our own history, better able to single out the causal or formative influences from among the complexity of antecedents. It is not easy to determine in the case of another what has been the influence or group of influences which should induce us to anticipate a certain type of character as embodied in conduct, since we may never know as intimately as the individual in question what these several groups of experiences were. Nor is it so easy to determine the component elements of the psychic complex of this individual at the time he reacts upon these experiences; yet the character of the whole psychic complex determines the outcome as much as the nature of the particular experience which precipitates action. In every case, the nature of the reaction as well as the mere apprehension of the influence must vary with the nature of the whole psychic complex.

In so far, then, as introspection gives more detailed and complete knowledge of the history of individual psychology with its accompanying behavior, it possesses a substantial advantage over other methods of estimating personality. But if introspection has distinct advantages, it has no less its own limitations. (1) It presupposes the culture of a certain social group and will itself be influenced by the contact which the individual applying it has had with other individuals. (2) Moreover, it is sufficiently problematic whether the individual can always determine efficient influences in his own case, treated as a unique experience, with more exactness than he can determine them in the case of others whom he studies under various conditions. In his own case, the conviction that a certain experience would induce an-

other anticipated particular experience, might be the element which makes condition A, including this conviction, sufficient to induce condition B. Only with great difficulty could he make the proper examination of himself with a view to determining the effect of this conviction, whereas a broader examination, including other individuals, might readily correct such a false induction. (3) The experience of the individual being unique, does not supply in itself means whereby the trivial can be separated from the important, since in his own experience they may have been associated in constant intimacy. (4) Again, he will have to observe his own behavior as another would observe it, in order both to check up and to give meaning to his introspective analysis. (5) His own case will not furnish more than individual history, whereas a higher purpose asks for tendencies of development, or forms of behavior which include individuals of various types. There are times when a man does not know himself as others know him; there are times when he cannot appreciate the meaning in his own life of tendencies in behavior except by looking to other biographies or autobiographies for the solution,—or at least for a suggestion of it.

So long as we can introspect after the manner of traditional psychology, we might look for personality in the character of the experiences, and much more in the way in which the several experiences are attended to, unified, and arranged in the individual's hierarchy of values. This consciousness, the psychologists tell us, must be something more than a stream of thought which simply flows, having more than a vague disparate cognizance of the various phases of its life. It implies a taint of consciousness in which all its states are somehow united, severally modifying the whole personality of which they are a part, and by virtue of which they receive a significance and an interpretation which makes into intelligible unity what otherwise would be meaningless disparity.

If we had a superior power of introspection and introjection which would enable us to understand in detail the human psychic existence about us, all their subjectivities becoming objective for us, it is, *a priori*, conceivable that they would exhibit an endless array of similarities and common content which, apart from the individualizing element, would present an array of monotony defying, in the absence of differences, any comparison. There might be no more variety among all these consciousnesses than among the books run off successively from the same type; or, they might differ as much among themselves as do the books on the shelves of any well-selected library,—a difference extending not only to form, color, and massiveness, but much more to emphasis, unity, value. Just as two books may deal with the same material in different combinations, and so, inferentially, if not expressly, assign different relative values, so two minds may present remarkable similarity when viewed in their subjective disparity, that is, when viewed in sections or in portions, whereas the relative values given these by the individualizing of them may exhibit significant contrast or even opposition. Hence, subjective states, which to our superior penetrating intelligence are similar in their component elements, may eventuate in, or may present in their wholeness and in their hierarchy of values, results which are dissimilar. The cross-currents of moral resolutions which disturb my stream of consciousness may, individually, not be different from those which penetrate yours. Yet your resolves may come to the surface in time of need and at the opportune moment for effectual discharge, while mine may desert me at those very times when they could direct thought or influence action. When we say that in consciousness it is not amount or variety but quality which gives significance to life and enables us to draw the distinctions which lie deepest, we mean no more than that similar subjective states are individualized in those different ways which do actually and of themselves make

all the difference in the world. The value of experience is not in knowing much, but in being able to judge wisely.

This test of personality we should apply in every instance where application is possible, irrespective of whatever additional tests may be adduced. It may be called fundamental in the sense that it gives us a better understanding of personality, in so far as it can actually be applied, than does any other approach. We have already mentioned some of the difficulties of application, and they are serious.

How then shall we learn of personality? "Wherever subjective attitudes stir us up and ask for agreement or disagreement," says Münsterberg, "there we appreciate personalities." How subjective attitudes, so long as they remain subjective attitudes, *can* stir us up is, however, the central mystery within whose inner recesses Münsterberg has not ventured. We fear it must ever remain a mystery unless these subjective states manifest themselves in modes of behavior. So far as this behavior is observable, it can be made the object of a particular study, and we can learn of personality with such limitations and possibilities as are attendant upon the pursuit of the method selected. The method may scarcely admit, because of our limitations in observing human behavior, of catching the 'fleeting spirit' or of penetrating to the 'core of self-hood.' We may, however, to a certain extent determine the unification of experience and the different ways of evaluating, in so far as the individual acts, and furnishes in his behavior something which we can observe and deal with in a systematic way.

By applying an objective test we can make a comparative study of personalities, in so far as they can be reduced to a common denominator. If first results be crude and unsatisfactory, we may still hope that the improvement of our methods of observation, as the essential problems become clearer, will eventually give us new and valuable insights into personality, insights which the

limitations inherent in other methods could never afford us.

We cannot, of course, study the behavior of an individual as an isolated thing. So far as his behavior tends to become an isolated thing, it becomes meaningless. The behavior of an idiot may have an internal consistency equal to that manifested in the behavior of an oyster, but the idiocy will remain so long as individual consciousness fails to relate itself or its meaning to social mind. Without some active, rational coöperation with the social group, the individual will not possess personality. Indeed, in any attempt to arrive at personality, we shall have to relate the individual mind to social mind.¹

We are prepared to venture this definition: Personality is the successful correlation of one's individual

¹ Thus our problem will be seen to be distinct from the problem of individuality and again from that of the ego. From among these individualities and these egos we must single out the characteristics that entitle one to be called a personality. In view of the above objections, we cannot accept Dr. Rashdall's solution (see his essay entitled "Personality: Human and Divine," in "Personal Idealism," p. 383) to the effect that, "what a person is for himself is entirely unaffected by what he is for any other, so long as he does not know what he is for that other. No knowledge of that person by another, however intimate, can ever efface the distinction between the mind as it is for itself and the mind as it is for another. The essence of a person is not what he is for another, but what he is for himself. It is there that his *principium individuationis* is to be found,—in what he is, when looked at from the inside." This test will not distinguish between personality and the illusion of personality, between achievement and the illusion of it. By Dr. Rashdall's test the decision as to whether a man is a lunatic, as society and the experts adjudge him to be, or whether he is actually the reigning king of England, as he believes himself to be, must be determined by consulting the individual in question rather than by consulting some more inclusive standard.

Mr. Bernard Bosanquet also would seem to reject our principle of explanation, his own theory of the value of experience being not unlike that of Dr. Rashdall. In "The Principle of Individuality and Value" (Macmillan, 1912), p. 188, he says: "I confess that the primary subjectivist argument seems to me to be simpler than introjectionism, and to apply to one's private experience without consideration of the relation to others. . . . It is, I believe, an error in fundamental principle to try and obtain any conclusion from comparison with others' experience which cannot be got from comparison with our own at different times."

program with the program of the group. The lowest type is that which merely adapts individual program to group program; the higher type is that in which the individual adapts the program of the group to his own programmatic ideals or demands. The former we may call adaptive or lower personalities, the latter, compelling or higher personalities. The correlation of programs will be expressed in the correlation of types of behavior. This behavior may be immediate and actual or future and potential, depending upon whether the behavior is now observable or only inferable,—that is, potentially observable. Intelligent imitation may stand for one type; securing acceptance of one's own reform measure will stand for the other. The correlation may, of course, be brought about rapidly, so that the adaptation is made actual in the lifetime of the individual, or it may not be complete until long after the personality has ceased to exist in the corporeal individual with whom it was identified. Thus, Plato's personality is assured whether or not he did as a matter of fact adapt the program of Athenian society to his own programmatic ideals, since he has at least made this adaptation in the case of later social groups. Such a method of arriving at personality may be difficult, because it is difficult to trace back from complicated conditions a persistent influence which has passed from a given individual to a group through the medium of many generations, which, in transmitting it, must themselves have been influenced by Plato. The fact that this influence works through varied media is no more an objection to accrediting the influence to the individual from whom it emanated, than the fact that a lightning bolt produces its effects only through atmospheric media, is an objection to attributing to it the particular effects which we lay at its door.

Such a conception is of necessity not without an implication of historical sequence. Personality must be viewed, if at all, through a time perspective. The time element, however, is merely incidental, and centuries do

not furnish a condition different in kind from the moments of individual life which are required for the construction of any individual plan or the realization of any idea. The individual does not become a personality solely through his own efforts, for no agency is able to achieve its influence save through a coöperation of other agencies none of which can be wholly passive, that is, can be nonentities. Be the limitations and conditions of the two types of personality what they may, "the one is the effort of such consciousness to take the world into itself, the other its effort to carry itself out into the world." The one may be the receptive center of the culture and influence of the past; the other

to his native center fast,
Shall into Future fuse the Past
And the world's flowing fates in his own mould recast.

If, as Matthew Arnold writes,

Most men eddy about
Here and there,—eat and drink,
Chatter and love and hate,
Gather and squander, are raised
Aloft, are hurled in the dust,
Striving blindly, achieving
Nothing; and then they die,—
Perish,—and no one asks
Who or what they have been,
More than he asks what waves
In the moonlit solitudes mild
Of the midmost ocean have swell'd,
Foam'd for a moment, and gone,—

then most men have notoriously failed to achieve personality. The influence which leaves but a temporary disturbance in social behavior, inculcating no new element in the rational purposes of the group, is not a personality-making influence.

The time element qualifies the social and the individual program in much the same way. In the struggle of group program with individual program, the efforts of the group do not become ineffectual upon the individ-

ual's program after the short period of the individual's life, if his post-mortem existence has any meaning for the group; conversely, the struggle of the individual program may persist through a long span of years limited only by the life of the group in which it is being realized. Plato still affects and is affected by the program of society so far as Plato stands for a concept whose meaning can be realized. It may be objected that society will not now modify Plato's program; but it will be admitted that it may modify it in so far as Plato's program is a meaningful concept or a felt force in society. It may, indeed, read into it interpretations which, the insight of higher minds may agree, are false. It no doubt does so continually. Accordingly, it will, perhaps, be always possible to infer that a progressive change of program on the part of society is being effected by Plato, while Plato, in turn, is not free from the compulsions of the social regime.

Two possible objections to this conception of personality may be anticipated. May not a personality such as Plato be equally an achievement even though,—perhaps by some misfortune,—he has never given his thoughts to society? Isn't it defining Plato in terms of what happens outside of Plato? This does seem something of a paradox, but if paradox it be, it is born of necessity. We estimate the strength of the battery in terms of what happens outside of it, we estimate the energy in a body by the behavior of those bodies outside it with which it comes into contact. The paradox can make little claim to novelty.

It seems incumbent upon us, if we would estimate Plato at all, to estimate him in terms of something outside of Plato's 'real self' in the traditional psychological sense, in terms of something affected, which is to say effected, by him. Just now we are not concerned about a Plato who could not be estimated. The supposed objection suggests a question of our own: Would not Plato have had equally a claim to personality if it had so hap-

pened that only early death in a good cause precluded him from reaching solutions to the problems which he had set himself? There seems no way to estimate personality except in terms of achievement made objective, and if Plato alone has profited by his achievements, he has himself alone to blame for society's lack of response and recognition. Even the most subtle influence, if it cannot be expressed in terms of observable achievement,—not necessarily observed achievement,—has no meaning. Moreover, granting the possibility, an achievement of personality that involved no wider social achievement would merely have the unenviable completion of turning back into itself without leaving so much as a record of its existence. No life in itself can achieve much; progress is forever thwarted unless it can be embodied in a social program. For descriptive purposes, the possibilities of purely individual advance are negligible,—they would not make a respectable foot-note in the history of culture. Short and small is the life of “the man who seeks to assert himself, to realize himself, to show what he has in him to be, in achievements which may make the world wonder, but which in their social effects are such that the human spirit, according to the law of its being, which is a law of development in society, is not advanced but hindered by them in the realization of its capabilities.” The ‘spirit operative in men’ is possible only in a social program that gives expression to, while it countenances, the realization of certain ideals that the individual seeks to realize. If the individual cannot escape from the ‘grip of the musty past,’ it is because social program is of such vital importance in the realization of any individual program. “Social life is to personality what language is to thought.”

Again, it may be objected that our definition of personality in terms of correlation of programs is purely descriptive, implying no real distinction between lower and higher. The forceful Schopenhauer, whose pessimistic philosophy induces his whole group to make way

with their lives, would be ranked as a personality equally with a no less forceful Alexander, who emphasizes the social life, extends the state bounds, gives new impetus to the social development and adjustment. Should we not introduce some ethical test, or at least a social or cultural test,—survival, for example? We certainly do not attempt to flee from ethical implications. Neither do we feel called upon to confront them now. Personalities are as amenable to ethical evaluations as are any other individuals; certainly an attempt to point them out cannot be considered an attempt to equalize or to shield them from further discrimination. As to survival, although it is, of course, no evidence in itself, yet almost invariably the survival of a group is one of the necessary conditions for the working out of its higher ideals. Plato would have enhanced his personality, in so far as he had given to the Greeks that greater opportunity to survive which was the *sine qua non* of the realization of that higher cultural status which he wished to be realized in future social achievement.

The vague concept of comparative cultural value should not be treated lightly though briefly. This much may be ventured as to what appears to be its inevitable relativity: It will embody a certain,—indeterminate because constantly fluctuating,—balance of intellect and emotion that will vary with each cultural group; it will not be possible to estimate it save in terms of the whole group life. That is to say, there is no cultural value independent of a group life, and there is no non-socially prejudiced way of estimating a value which transcends our group prejudices. We are as unfitted as is the savage to estimate the comparative worth of our distinct cultural values. You would have to be born, bred, and aged in Bushman society in order to appreciate the value of that culture, thus unfitting yourself for estimating any other. Such values exist because of our peculiar accommodation to peculiar circumstances of tradition and habit, and there is no common meeting-ground for

the ideals and satisfactions of various cultural groups. Remove the historical conditions and, for the psychologist of comparative culture, these values exist just because they do. The very nature and dependence of these values precludes any standard for impartially estimating them. So far as this is true, judgments upon cultural values must be relative; hence, to a certain extent, any hierarchy of personalities would have to be relative, and no standard for estimating them would be applicable to all cultural groups alike. It seems to us that the description of personality which we have given will be equally applicable, and our definition equally justifiable, whatever arrangement these personalities and the cultures they reflect may receive in a hierarchy of ethical values and whatever position may be assigned them by the philosopher in an all-inclusive *Kulturgeschichte*.

In conclusion, let us consider the application of social psychology to the problem of personality. In our definition of personality we seem to have opposed the individual to the group. The question now arises whether we are to explain personality in terms of individual psychology or in terms of social psychology. The distinction seems to be essentially one of point of view, the preference depending in the last event upon the decision as to which method of approach is better suited to our purposes. The problem will, perhaps, be clearer if we take for consideration a small but self-sufficient and well-organized tribe at a low scale of culture where we are without the complex relations of civilized life. From one point of view, the tribal group may be conceived as embodying certain beliefs and activities common to all the individuals which compose the tribe, or, as may be, centered in one or more of the group activities which, working in coördination, express the tribal life. The psychology of the tribe or of the component group considered as so many units, we may call social psychology; and we may apply the same term to the psychology of the individual members of any group so far as we study

them either collectively or severally as component elements of the group. Viewed from the perspective of social psychology, each so-called individual action or activity can be explained as in some way the outcome of the group-life, and will fall within some one of the categories which social psychology supplies or may find it necessary to invent in order to serve its purposes. It is as justifiable to class individuals in this way as to class them in categories of weight, height, or color; moreover, the classification is desirable in so far as it serves our immediate purposes and does not conflict with higher purposes. If, however, we suppose that this, because wholly true, is the whole truth, we mistake aspect for wholeness. The facts of social life will just as well answer to an analytic individual psychology, which will fully account for the phenomenon of individuals acting in a more or less definite and ascertainable coördination, as they do when we find them associated in one common group life; their own nature and tendency to react under various social stimuli making that group life possible. For this reason, we may approach the problem either after the manner of Ross and Durkheim by studying group activities, or, after the manner of McDougall, reach the social psychology through the psychic make-up of the individual members of the group. Since the concepts of social psychology are indispensable to our present purpose, we shall, in the main, approach the problem from this point of view.

Social psychology should supply us with at least two kinds of information, the possession of which is a requisite in any attempt to estimate personality. That information should be, first, with regard to the range of action and thought or of behavior, actual and potential, which the socio-psychological *milieu* offers. Such information can be had only by a detailed study of the whole culture to which the individual belongs, and obviously, will differ with every social group. Hence, the indications of personality cannot be found in any defi-

nite type or types of behavior, but is wholly relative and must be estimated in terms which vary with every cultural group.

In any social group, whether of civilized or of primitive peoples, as social psychologists we should be able to predict the behavior under certain various circumstances of the individuals belonging to that group. In some cases we should not be able to predict because of inadequate understanding of the conditions; in some we should find our prediction failing because, inevitably, certain individuals constantly show themselves to be apparent exceptions to the law which applies to the great mass. So long as the social psychologist is consistent with his initial conception, he will explain this latter case as he would explain the former, *viz.*, as a misunderstanding due to insufficient grasp of the situation. Even though he should never be able to get intimate and detailed information sufficient to satisfy his demands, he would no more admit these apparently spontaneous activities to be without the laws of social psychology, than the physicist would admit 'chance' in the physical world to be independent of the physical laws which apply rigidly in the world of matter.

Even so, be it admitted that this is merely remaining consistent with a chosen point of view labeled a 'conception,' without involving the necessity of supposing that it will answer all our needs in striving to arrive at an appreciation of human nature. Moreover, as that which defeats the expectations of social psychology is merely an expression of the limitations of that science in making its inductions, and does not signify a program with false presuppositions, it may be objected that we can scarcely find in these apparent exceptions the quality of personality which we seek. It is true that these exceptions include lunatics as well as geniuses, criminals as well as reformers, and as exceptions furnish no test for discrimination. The criminologists and the social psychologists tell us that to a certain extent such

things as suicide, crime, insanity, can be anticipated in number and locality, if not in the family circle itself. A knowledge and consideration of such exceptions is not without its value, for it seems both to give information as to the fixity or variability of the social type and to show the comparative uniformity or complexity of the various influences to which the individual is subject.

In the range of action and thought, or of behavior, actual and potential, may be included the whole range of imagination as shown in the ethical ideals,—however glaringly discrepant with actual behavior,—in literature, in laws, in social forces, in myths and traditions. When we attempt some solution of the problem of personality in primitive society, where the comparative simplicity makes possible a many-sided approach and a grasp of all the vital aspects of their culture at once, this range of imagination, as we find it in myths and in social and ethical ideals, will give us a distinguishing psychic atmosphere that is indispensable for comparative purposes. It supplies the range of suggestions which may act through the individual upon the group in a more definite and pronounced way, giving new trend to the group's development and assuring increased progress along certain particular lines. Thus, working wholly within the realm of social psychology, the adaptive may become the compelling personality, since the inspiration is social rather than individual, objective rather than subjective. In a word, our concept of personality seems most adequate for comparative purposes; interpreted in terms of social psychology, it enables us to see the extent to which the *rôle* of personality corresponds to conscious or unconscious changes in the group activities. It does not proclaim nor prejudice any ultimate interpretation of these phenomena.

We possess personality in so far as we deflect the social program, be the society a small one or an all-inclusive one; in so far as we achieve personality, our petty lives become living parts of infinite mundane progress.

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